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DISPATCHED BY MAIL 10/15/50, 10/15/50

X-2 (OSS)
German Section

I. RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION

Considerable information, from many different sources, is available on Nazi resistance plans. Unfortunately, much of this information is not of high quality; but the variety of sources, and the high confirmatory value of some of them, make it possible to present material in this report as having some substantial evidence behind it. When interpretations of such material are made in the body of the report, they are indicated as "London Comment".

The recent G-2 R & A Report #14E (The Alpine Reduit) points out that little direct evidence has been obtained of real military preparations to defend the reduit, and that its exact area and focal points are extremely vague.

II. AREA OF RESISTANCE

1. Most reports at hand agree on the general area of the central reduit in South Germany and Austria. With BUCHENBERG as the headquarters, the reduit would extend northeast to the mountains of the SAALBURG MOUNT, south to the SAALBACH PASS (or to BUCHEN), west to VERBACH, and east to the SAALBACH PASS. One report speaks of four centers of resistance within this region: SAALBURG-BUCHENBERG, the area of BUCHEN, JENBACH (on the INN River), and KATZENBACH. The area is thus mainly in Western Austria, with a small part of the mountains of Southern Bavaria included.

2. There is also good evidence of the intention to hold numerous outposts of this bastion, but whether it is expected that the Wehrmacht or the SS will take care of this is unclear. The regions mentioned include the BLACK FOREST, the SAAR-OR. MOUNTAIN chains, the BOHEMIA-MASSIF, and in one instance, the BILAND mountains.

3. The withdrawal of Government and Nazi Party offices and files toward Central and Southern Germany gives support to the information in II, 1 and II, 2 as does the establishment of some parts of the NSD in BAD N. and in BUCHENBERG (BUCHENBERG) and at BUCHENBERG and BUCHENBERG in BAVARIA. So does the important role of SS training schools in that area (Ordensburg BUCHENBERG, Junkerschule BAD TOLLN); also, the evidence that the administration and direction of the SS for AUSTRIA is becoming separated from that of the remainder of the SS, and that strong attempts have been made recently to popularize the struggle to the end, among the Tyrolese, with appeals to regional patriotism and to the sacred memory of ADOLF HITLER.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

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REPORT ON THE RESISTANCE PLANS

II.

III. DIRECTION OF GP.

1. The consensus of evidence is that the SS, not the Wehrmacht, is to control the military side of resistance, as well as the political, sabotage, and intelligence activities.

2. Numerous names have been mentioned of persons likely to direct the resistance movement; most of them lack confirmation, but they have in common the fact that many have had experience in fighting against partisans in occupied territories, and therefore may be assumed to be experts in guerrilla warfare. Among the men named (besides the inevitable HEIMANN and DELMANN) are high SS military or police officials such as VON WITTE, SSR WITTE, HAAR himself (Chief der Stabs und SS), WITTE (whose retirement from the public eye some time ago might be an additional qualification), and FRANK, former Governor-General of Poland. London comment: It is quite possible that a committee including these men and others may be, or may have been, established to run the movement.

3. Within the SS, it appears that the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), which now controls the whole of German intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities, will handle that part of resistance, while the military operations as such will come under the Waffen-SS. Amt VI of the RSHA under SCHILLER ED, now controls regular intelligence; the portions of Amt VI and of the Militarisches Amt under SEKRETER handle sabotage and subversion; Amt III, the old SS Office, and Amt IV, the Gestapo, handle internal affairs, and, according to one report, Amt IV is to have a foreign section to instigate disorders outside of Germany; Amt V, the Kripo, so far does not seem to be slated for a very active part in resistance.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND FORM OF RESISTANCE

1. OTTO SEORZKEY, in his capacity as head of Section VI 5 of the RSHA, and of the III. Amt D, heir of the old Abwehr II, and with the special units he has already trained (see IV. 2), appears to be the most likely head of sabotage and subversive activities during the resistance period. London comment: Possibly this side of resistance, which is technically still under the jurisdiction of Amt VI and its leader SCHILLER, will be separated from the formal intelligence service, which will remain under SCHILLER.

2. The sabotage activities formerly carried on by the BRANDENBURG Division are almost wholly in the hands of U. G. SEHNY, who controls for this purpose the Jagdverbände, and under them the Streifkorps, as well as the SS Jägerbattalion 502.

3. Earlier reports on resistance plans stressed the organization of "Funkergruppen", a typical cell arrangement for secret subversive actions by small groups, whose members, except for the leader, would be unknown to one another. There is no reason to doubt that this form

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III.

of organization may be used for small-scale and domestic or industrial sabotage and subversion; nor is it incompatible with the employment (reported elsewhere) of Stosstrupp, small guerrilla units, which an unconfirmed report states that two or three thousand (a total of about 40,000 men) will be trained, with a small number already passed through the Gröensturm, especially ~~Stosstrupp~~. Other reports add that these men are all SS members and all volunteers.

4. The part of the HITLER-JUGEND, and perhaps of its female counterpart, the BUND DEUTSCHER MAEDCHEN, may be considerable. Many of these youngsters are said to have been trained already, under the SD, in preparation for this work. They appear to be especially qualified as scouts and small-scale intelligence and sabotage operators.

5. Though the VOLKSTURM has been alleged in various reports to have an important place in the preparations for resistance, little specific evidence on this matter appears. London comment: Experience so far in the occupied parts of Germany tends to show that the NAZI efforts to create a people's war--which would have meant an essential role for the VOLKSTURM in resistance--have been unsuccessful.

V. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. As is stated in IV.1 and IV.2 above, ~~BRONZEWY~~ has now in hand the sabotage and subversion activities of both the NSDA and the former Stuehr. ~~SCHILLINGBERG~~ has retained the highbrow forms of intelligence, has separated his own Amt VI (and the less important Amt VII) almost completely from the remainder of the RSHA, and has thus set himself in one of the key positions for the management of the resistance movement. It appears that Amt VI, not Amt III as was once assumed, will be the main spring of secret intelligence for the resistance, and that it will supply the leading personnel for that field.

2. London comment: The unique positions of ~~BRONZEWY~~ and ~~SCHILLINGBERG~~ in relation to the resistance movement make it seem possible that the remainder of the RSHA, under ~~KALTENBRUNNER~~, will be relatively less significant in this; probably Aemter I-V may remain under his direction, with Amt IV, the GESTAPO, retaining its important function in dealing with internal dissent, Aemter I-III diminishing in importance, and the members of Amt V, the SAPO, perhaps taking little open part in the resistance, partly because of their "professional", i.e. primarily non-political, attitude, partly because of the NSDAP's desire to have such civil servants available for the Allies to use in the hope of infiltrating them.

VI. CONCEPTS

1. London comment: Even aside from the accumulation of fairly good evidence, the concept of a war to the end, and the area chosen for it, are both completely in line with the attitude of the Nazi party leaders--though the former is presumably not in line with the

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IV.

ideas of the Wehrmacht. The combination of military defensibility, homeland love, and melodramatic setting that appears in the fight from a retreat in the Bavarian-Austrian Alps is exactly what would appeal to the Wagnerian sense of myth and his closest devotees.

2. London comment: None of the evidence speaks of the length of time that the party leaders expect to carry on resistance, but at least one report refers to plans for the stay-behind Nazis, in other parts of Germany, to lie low for a year or two, and then to start operations.

3. London comment: As of the present, the share of the people as a whole in a really national resistance movement appears to be small; reliance is certainly placed on a picked section of the S., not on the Volk. There is perhaps special reason for this in the Bavarian-Austrian area, for, though that region produced the original Nazis, and has continued to produce some of the toughest ones, it has also produced some of the strongest resistance to Nazism, in the form especially of the Bavarian hierarchy and the monarchist sentiment in Bavaria and to some degree in Austria.

4. London comment: What part the Wehrmacht plays in these final plans is hard to determine. None of the reports on the defense of the retreat, or the wider scope of underground activity, assign any share to the Wehrmacht; the last-ditch stand appears to be entirely an SS affair, and specifically an SA affair.

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